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Keeping the Outsiders Out: Civil
Rights, The "Non-Issue" of the
1992 Presidential Election
Mark Stern, University of Central Florida
Overview
Civil rights, an issue that critically aided the Reagan-Bush
elections of the 1980's, practically disappeared from the presidential
election issue agenda of 1992. This would appear to be a remarkable
occurrence, given the importance of this issue to Republican
presidential electoral hopes during the past two decades and that a major
urban riot. dominated by black participants, occurred during the 1992
presidential election year. This paper examines why and how civil
rights became a "non-issue," i.e., an issue not perceived as part of the
political agenda, during the 1992 presidential campaign. The emphasis
is on the strategy of the Democratic presidential nominee, Bill Clinton,
and how he sought to mute the civil rights issue during the 1992
presidential campaign.
In recent decades civil rights issues created a critical wedge between
major elements of the traditional New Deal Democratic coalition. This
wedge, between African-Americans and working-class whites,
substantially contributed to the Republican presidential election
victories of the previous decade. Many analysts and political strategists
believed that the GOP, with the help of Democratic defectors, had
forged a new and possibly durable winning presidential electoral
coalition. Therefore, this paper also looks at how President George
Bush backed away from the civil rights issue during the campaign on
1992.

Introduction
Politicians are preoccupied with creating and maintaining winning
political coalitions. It is the winning coalition that gets to hold office
and office is the key to political power. 1 But electoral coalitions
1The seminal monograph in this area, from which there has flowed an
outpouring of contemporary work on coalition theory and coalition
building, is William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New
Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1963).
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change over time, as they are inherently unstable. 2 V. 0. Key, Jr.'s
seminal work on political alignments has served as the major
framework for the analysis of electoral coalition change and
development.3 Key modified and extended his argument on the nature of
critical elections and changes in electoral coalition alignments, as have
other scholars. But the fact that political change is, as Key noted, the
result of election processes that "operate inexorably ... election after
election to form new party alignments and to build new party
groupings," remains central to an understanding of democratic politics.4
E. E. Schattschneider added to Key's analysis by pointing out that
periods of realignment occur not only with a change in party
composition, but also with a transformation of "the agenda of American
politics." That is, the current issue battle lines are replaced with new
issues and new party battle lines about these issues.5 Politicians often
operate as entrepreneurs who create or recreate issues to attract votes.6
It is usually through the vehicle of elections that politicians operate as
issue entrepreneurs. Politicians use issues to garner votes. As
Anthony Downs succinctly stated the case: "parties formulate policies
in order to win elections ...."7 Elections therefore provide a periodicity
to changes in the public policy agenda; they serve as a focus for
politicians to bring forward issues as they seek to attract the votes
necessary to win office.8
2William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (San Francisco, Ca.:
Freeman, 1982), p. 209.
3 V. 0 . Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17
(1959): 13- 18.
4 V. 0. Key, Jr., "Secular Realignment and the Party System," Journal of
Politics 21 (1959) : 198-210. The literature on political realignment
appears to be ever-developing. A few of the more prominent studies in this
area include : Byron E. Shafer, ed., The End of RealignmenJ? (Madison, WI:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the
Party System, (rev . ed. ; Washington , D.C.: Brookings, 1983); Everett Carl
Ladd, Jr . with Charles Hadley, Transformation of the Party System (2nd ed .;
New York: Norton, 1978; John R. Petrocik, Party Coalitions (Chicago :
University of Chicago Press, 1971); Walter Dean Burnham , Critical
Elections (New York: Norton, 1970).
5E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (Hinsdale, Ill.: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1960, 1976), p. 88.
6John W . Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1984), pp. 129-30; Nelson W. Polsby, Political Innovation
in America (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 161; Jack L.
Walker, "Performance Gaps, Policy Research , and Political Entrepreneurs,"
Policy Studies Journal 3 (1974): 112-116.
7 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy
(New York:
Harrier & Row, 1957), p . 28.
Pols by, pp . 165-74.
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Of course, the public must respond to the politicians' entreaties for
change, if change is to talce place. James L. Sundquist points out that a
necessary condition for political realignment to talce place is that the
electorate must polarize itself on an issue and politicians must publicly
contest the issue and maintain visibly differing polar positions. 9 The
heart of politics in democracies, according to Schattschneider, rests on
these assumptions and the assumption that the majority party will
operate to implement its policy pledges once it is in office. He writes:
"Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing
leaders and organiz.ations define the alternatives of public policy in such
a way that the public can participate in the decision-making
process .... " 10
However, important issues may well be ignored in public debate,
or defined out of the political arena. When this occurs, the weakest
groups and individuals in society are often the losers.
To
Schattschneider, the "socialization of conflict," the placement of issues
on the public policy debate agenda, is a critical element in politics,
especially for those who are already among the weakest members of
society. They typically want to involve more people in an issue
debate, to tip the odds and move the balance of forces toward their
position on the issue. 11
The New Deal realignment was built around the highly vocal and
visible opposition of the monied, conservative economic interests
against the Democratic party's commitment to the disadvantaged and
generally weaker elements of American society. The New Deal
coalition, the alliance that was forged by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the
wake of the 1932 presidential election, established the Democratic party
as the national majority party. The New Deal coalition has been so
durable that is has become part of American folklore, and it is so well
known that its constituent groupings--Catholics, Jews, union members,
big-city populations, poor people, and African-Americans--are broadly
familiar to the mass public. Yet this coalition has undergone changes.
The most notable shifts have been the defection of the white South and,
more recently, non-southern working class whites from the Democratic
alliance, and the emergence of the black southerner within the alliance.
There is little doubt that in the 1960's both the partisan coalitions
and the issues on which electoral outcomes had depended since the
1930's shifted dramatically. There is solid evidence that the 1964
presidential election served as a critical event for this occurrence, and
9Sundquist,

p. 14.
lOSchattschneider, p. 141.
11Schattschneider, 7, 40. An extension of this argument is made in
Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An
Analytic Framework," American Political Science Review, 51 (1957): 632-

42.
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that divisions over the pace, breadth and depth of governmental action
in civil rights was a major cause of this shift. 12 The New Deal
coalition was built around the subordination of ethnic, regional and
other differences to a class-based alliance. Carmines and Stimson's
perceptive analysis of electoral alignment in the wake of the 1964
presidential election demonstrates that racial issues are now generally
subordinate to class issues in defining political realities for the mass
public. They find that "racial issues, in sum, seem not only to be at
the core of the [recent] increase in mass issue consistency but also to
provide a significant and stable element in the meaning of
liberal/conservative political beliefs." 13 Since 1968, Gerald Pomper
finds, "all partisan groups recognized the existence of different party
positions on this [racial] issue and all were convinced that the
Democrats favor greater government action on civil rights than do the
Republicans." 14 The consequences of these changes in public attitudes
were not only noted by the Republicans but acted upon.
Kevin Phillips, a Nixon aide in the 1968 campaign, argued in The
Emerging Republican Majority that the GOP had to redefine the race
issue, from civil rights for blacks to misuse of funds and government
efforts on behalf of wasteful economic programs and morally incorrect
social policies. This would tum the race issue around and drive lowerclass whites, Catholics, and others out of the party of Roosevelt and
into the Republican fold. 15 Phillips and other GOP strategists who
subsequently took this position never argued that they were for racial
discrimination or against blacks being treated equally. Instead they
claimed they were for equal treatment of all Americans and for "good"
values. They were against reverse discrimination, the coddling of
criminals, the acceptance or encouragement of out-of-wedlock births and
welfare dependency. In 1982, Phillips wrote of a "New Right" of
"populist-conservative groups emphasizing social issues, religious and
cultural alienation, anti-elite rhetoric, lower-middle-class constituencies,
populist fund-raising and plebiscitary opinion mobilization." This New
Right sees itself as an inheritor of George Wallace's supporters, without
any link to the racism that he espoused in the 1960's.16
12 Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue
Evolution
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Robert Huckfeldt and Carol
Weitzel Kohfeld, Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics
(Urbana, Ill .: University of Illinois Press, 1989).
13Carmines and Stimson, p. 134.
14Gerald M . Pomper, "Toward A Responsible Two-Party System: What,
Again?" Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 932.
15Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle,
N.Y.: 1969).
16 Kevin P. Phillips, Post-Conservative America (New York: Random
House, 1982), pp. 47 -49 .
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In the 1980's Phillips' program of action was put into place as
Ronald Reagan and the New Right gained control of the presidential
wing of the Republican party. The Reagan 1980 and 1984 election
strategies and the Bush 1988 election strategy were consistent with
Phillips' plan and carried the day for the GOP. In the current era of
American politics, Huckfeldt and Kohfeld argue, "race frequently serves
as a wedge that disrupts lower-class [black and white] coalitions,
thereby driving out class in our political arrangements." And, "race
continues to be the most important line of conflict in American
electoral politics. "17 This wedge was basic to the emergence of
Republican presidential majorities during the 1980's.
Edsall and Edsall's 1991 study of the Reagan electoral strategy finds
that "race has fueled the ascendancy of the presidential wing of the
Republican party and has blocked Democratic efforts to revive a
majority coalition. "18 In recent presidential elections, the more
Democratic party identifiers perceived that the GOP was opposed to aid
to minorities, the more likely they were to defect to the Republican
candidate. The Democratic party was consistently perceived as
supportive of such aid, and this was opposed by many of their core
partisan supporters. 19 In every state-wide 1990 election in which the
GOP made race a factor--through the use of the term "quotas" or the
linkage of a candidate to Jesse Jackson, who is perceived as an
aggressive and overt defender of racial preferences for AfricanAmericans--the Republican candidate emerged the winner.20
The Edsalls' study of the contemporary political party battle
concludes, "race will remain an exceptionally divisive force in politics
as long as the debate is couched in covert language and in coded
symbols." This divisiveness advantages the Republicans who continue
to oppose programs centered on minority preferences while the
Democrats support such programs.21 However, Herbert Asher argues,
"for preferential treatment [of minorities] to become a critical issue, the
Democratic party and its candidates would have to advocate a set of
measures that are seen as favoring minorities at the expense of
whites .... "22
Both the Republicans and the Democrats pulled back from their
17Huckfeldt and Kohfeld, pp. ix, 1.
18Toomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D.

Edsall, Chain Reaction (New York:
W . W. Norton & Company, 1991), p. 256.
19Robert Weissberg, 'The Democratic Party and the Conflict Over Racial
Policy," in Benjamin Ginsberg and Alan Stone, eds., Do Elections Matter?
(2nd ed.; Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1991), p. 162.
20 Edsall and Edsall, p. 257.
21 Edsall and Edsall, pp. 281, 257, 186.
22 Herbert B. Asher, Presidential Elections and American Politics (5th
ed.; Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1992), 325-326.
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respective pos1ltons on major civil rights legislation as the 1992
presidential election approached. 23 Yet, just prior to the presidential
election year it appeared that both major parties were going to harden
their polar positions on this issue. In 1990 President Bush vetoed a
proposed Civil Rights Act after denouncing it as a "quotas" bill. His
veto was upheld with the overwhelming support of the GOP
congressional delegation. In 1991, after ten months of bitter partisan
debate, the Congress, with the President's blessing, passed a new Civil
Rights Act--with large majorities of both parties supporting the
legislation. The near-election of David Duke, the former Nazi turned
Republican, to the governorship of Louisiana changed the political
atmosphere. A major public outcry over Duke's association with the
GOP convinced many moderate Republicans that the party had gone too
far in its anti-civil rights advocacy.
Several key Republican Senators, led by John Warner of Virginia,
told the President that they might lose their reelection campaigns if
moderate whites in their states defected from the GOP because the party
was advocating a civil rights position that was too strident. The DukeGOP connection symbolized a radicalism that was unacceptable to
many Americans. President Bush was warned that several Republican
senators up for reelection in 1992 would have to vote for the
Democratic version of the legislation if he could not work out a
compromise. Subsequently, after extensive debate within the White
House, the President agreed that he could revise his position and a new
compromise on this bill could be negotiated . He agreed to a bipartisan
interpretive memorandum that waffled on the meaning of the affirmative
action sections of the proposal.
The GOP gamble on polarizing the electorate over race was
suspended. On the Democratic side, the original 1990 bill was
weakened with language which specifically forbade the use of quotas.
In addition, a lower limit was placed on awards possible for punitive
damages when intent to discriminate was not proven. Thus both the
GOP's and the Democrats' hard-line positions on this issue were muted.
Partisan differences over civil rights were no longer as clear as they had
been.

The 1992 Election

and Civil Rights

For Bill Clinton and his allies, civil rights, the issue that had
devastated the Roosevelt coalition in recent years, was to be side23An analysis of the inter-party and intra -party Republican struggle over
the proposed 1990 civil rights legislation and the 1991 civil rights
proposals that became law is provided in: Mark Stern, "Party Alignments
and Civil Rights, Then and Now," Paper presented at the 1992 Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association .
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stepped in their drive for the presidency. As he sought the Democratic
presidential nomination, and then as he campaigned as the party's
nominee, the symbols and associations of civil rights advocacy moved
to the background of Clinton's campaign panoply. Civil rights was not
to be a Clinton campaign issue.
Contact with Jesse Jackson, the leading national civil rights
proponent of the day, was perceived as hazardous by the Clinton
election team. Association with Jackson was seen as strong civil rights
advocacy. Throughout the 1992 election season, therefore, the Clinton
campaign team kept Jackson as far away from its candidate as possible.
In June, Clinton publicly detached himself from the Reverend Jesse
Jackson's apparent support of extreme black nationalism when he,
Clinton, condemned rap singer Sister Souljah's statement, "why not
have a week to kill white people," at a meeting of the Jackson-led
Rainbow Coalition. Sister Souljah had been invited to speak at the
meeting the night before Clinton addressed the group, and Jesse Jackson
sat in attendance as Clinton proceeded to attack his guest. Jackson was
outraged and denounced Clinton's coming to the coalition meeting to
"stage a well planned sneak attack, without the courage to confront but
with a calculation to embarrass." Clinton's "Machiavellian maneuver,"
Jackson complained, " [was intended] purely to appeal to conservative
whites by containing Jackson and isolating Jackson." 24 But as a
"Political Memo" column in the New York Times noted, "with his
criticism of comments by Sister Souljah... [Clinton] accomplished
much for his campaign. He ... distanced himself from the Rev. Jesse
Jackson and spoke out only against reverse racism." The Governor
argued he was "absolutely not" playing to racial intolerance with his
remarks about Sister Souljah. "I grew up in a segregated society," he
rejoined, "and I have devoted my public life to trying to overcome
feelings of prejudice. "25
Despite the lack of support for the Arkansas Governor by Jesse
Jackson and the Rainbow Coalition, Clinton was generally perceived by
liberal opinion-leaders as the Democratic advocate of civil rights. 26 He
couched his primary election appeal in terms of broad economic justice,
employment, and getting the country to work. William Julius Wilson
wrote in the New York Times, "Mr. Clinton has destroyed the myth
that blacks will only respond if a candidate highlights race-specific
issues and programs." Wilson argued that Clinton's general appeals of
the need to help poor people and the need to get health coverage for all
"has allowed blacks ... to identify with a candidate who addresses them
24New

York Times, June 14, June 17, June 19, 1992.
Ifill, "Clinton Deftly Navigates Shoals of Racial Issues," New
York Times, June 17, 1992, p. 22.
26 "Candidates Court Jackson Supporters," New York Times, January 26,
1992 .
25 Gwen
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without narrowly focusing his message on race." 27 While Clinton's
message appealed to middle-of-the-road whites--and, as Jackson
suggested, perhaps some Reagan Democrats--the Arkansas Governor
held his base of support among black Democratic voters. He received
70 percent of all black votes cast in the Democratic primary elections
while also holding on to 47 percent of the white Democratic primary
votes. He was a "new kind of Democrat" and getting tangled up in
debates about civil rights issues was not on his new Democratic agenda.
When riots broke out in Los Angeles on May 1, 1992, after the
"not guilty" finding in the Rodney King case, President Bush's response
was initially muted. In a nationwide television address he spoke of the
steps he was taking to restore order and expressed concern at "the
brutality of [the] mob, pure and simple." He talked of his own lack of
understanding of the verdict, but that it had to be respected as part of the
justice process. "There's a difference," he argued, "between frustration
with the law and direct assaults upon our legal system. In a civilized
society, there can be no excuse ... [for the actions] that have terrorized
the law abiding citizens of Los Angeles. "28
Candidate Clinton's response to the Los Angeles riot was also
initially muted, and evolved over a period of days . He first expressed
sympathy and understanding for the rioters, as well as criticism that
President Bush's "absence of action" on urban issues had fostered the
situation that led to the rioting. But, the day after the rioting began the
Governor also criticized the rioters as "lawless vandals. "29 The
Governor renewed his attack on the administration after White House
press secretary Marlin Fitzwater spoke of the riot being a result of the
social welfare programs created by the Democrats in the 1960's and
l 970's. Clinton scathingly attacked "twelve years of denial and neglect"
of urban problems by the Reagan/Bush administrations. 30 On May 6,
two days after Clinton's attack, the President toured the ravaged area and
spoke of being "embarrassed by interracial violence and prejudice." He
spoke of his own "sense of shame and sorrow at the destruction and
horror of the events." He spoke of things being different in the
future. 31 Thereafter, until late in the general election campaign, both
candidates publicly down-played the Los Angeles riot and the issues it
27William

Juliu s Wilson, 'The Right Message, " New York Times, March
17, 1992 .
28 "Excerpts From Bush's Speech on Los Angeles Riots: 'Need to Restore
Order,"' New York Times , May 2, 1992, p. 8.
29 Gwen Ifill, "Clinton's Reaction to Rioters Evolves ," New York Times,
May 2, 1992, p. 9.
30 Robert Pear, "Clinton Assails G .O.P. 'Neglect ' as Riots' Cause, " May
6, 1992, 1, 26.
31 Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Finds ' Horror' on Los Angeles Tour," New
York Times, May 8, 1992, p. 1, 18.
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brought forth.
The 1992 Democratic National Convention was a love-in, with
only minor words of dissent spoken by Jerry Brown, the last hold-out
Democratic challenger to Mr. Clinton. Unlike the previous two
Democratic conventions there were no bitter rules fights. The 1984 and
1988 rules fights were waged "over how much leverage a black
candidate, Jesse Jackson, would carry into the convention." 32 In 1992
Jackson took himself out of the running for the presidency, and despite
the vocal insistence by both him and his supporters, he was not
seriously considered as a finalist for the vice-presidential slot on the
Democratic ticket. Jackson spoke softly at the convention, and he told
reporters that his role in the campaign had yet to be worked out. After
the convention, the black leader commented: "There was this strategy
[by Clinton] of distancing from labor, from cities and from the
Rainbow. Distance is an innovative way of building a coalition. For
Clinton to win a general election the strategy must be inclusive."
That inclusiveness, as Jackson understood it, meant a major
campaign role for himself and the Rainbow. 33Jackson would campaign
across the country to get out the Democratic vote, and occasionally
spealc to Clinton on the telephone, but throughout the general election
season Clinton maintained his public distance from Jackson. 34 At the
September 9 annual meeting of the National Baptist Convention, Mr.
Jackson, according to the New York Times, "sat stony behind Mr.
Clinton as the Arkansas Governor received a warm reception from the
religious group." Prior to the meeting stories had circulated that the
two leaders were going to publicly get together and talk about the
campaign, but what ensued was far from a public talk. The Times
reported, "Mr. Jackson met Mr. Clinton briefly in a backstage restroom
while more than a dozen clergymen milled around outside and guarded
the doorway . Mr. Jackson said later that Mr. Clinton agreed to meet .
with him next week to discuss voter registration. "35 That meeting
never occurred. 36 Jackson had his public meeting with President-elect
32Edsall and Edsall, p. 264.
33 "Jackson Waits for Plan From Clinton," New York Times, July 18,
1992, p.l, 9.
34 "0n Sidelines of Presidential Race, Jackson Tums to Local
Campaigns," New York Times, July 26, 1992, p. l; "Mississippi Trip
Offers Jackson a Role," New York Times, July 28, 1992, p. 1; "Jackson to
Join Democratic Drive," New York Times, September 4, 1992, p. 1.
35New York Times, September 10, 1992.
36 0n the Phil Donahue television show Clinton received criticism for
not meeting with Jackson, but he responded, "I don't think you can judge me
just on how many meetings I've had with Reverend Jackson." He indicated
that he did speak with Jackson on the telephone . See: "Clinton and Gore
Return to the 'Call-In,"' New York Times, October 7, 1992.
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Clinton at the Governor's mansion in Little Rock on November 23,
1992.
The Clinton-Gore team played to the broad middle-class in its
convention presentation and the campaign that followed . The
convention film introduced the Democratic presidential nominee with an
emphasis on his southern, relatively lower middle-class family, his
hard-working mother, and his grit and determination to succeed. The
nominee's acceptance speech noted: "In the name of those who do the
work, pay the taxes, raise the kids, and play by the rules--in the name
of the hard working who make up our forgotten middle class--1 proudly
accept your nomination ." He reminded his audience, "I am a product of
the middle class." 37
On the last day of the convention, Ronald H. Brown, the publicly
quiet, well-dressed, and now powerful chair of the Democratic National
Committee, received three standing ovations from the party 's leaders.
Brown had been a top Jackson adviser in 1988, but had helped dissuade
him from going for the presidency in 1992. He had also helped
persuade New York Governor Mario Cuomo, whose appeal to big city
white ethnics was unassailable, to make the nominating speech for
Governor Clinton. 38 Brown's behind-the-scenes maneuvering had been
instrumental in staging a harmonious Democratic National Convention-unknown in recent years--and in unifying support for the party's
standard bearer .. Brown was an African-American who understood and
succored the Clinton presidential strategy, and he now appeared
consistently at stage center in the Democratic campaign of 1992. He
was the kind of African-American Democrat that the Clinton campaign
wanted the nation to see: a moderate, articulate, visible link to big-city
Democrats and their African-American allies.
On July 16, the last day of the Democratic convention, Ross Perot
announced his withdrawal from the presidential race. The immediate
beneficiary of this move was Bill Clinton. What had looked in June to
be a close, three-way race for the presidency became, according to many
immediate post-convention polls, a near-certain victory for Clinton.
Clinton was now ahead of Bush by a 55 percent to 31 percent margin.
The post-convention boost that came to most new presidential
nominees was magnified for Clinton by the movement of Perot backers
into his camp over Bush by a 45 percent to 25 percent margin. 39 Paul
Tully, political director of the Democratic National Committee,
remarked, "Perot's disappearance freed up a set of voters who are the
37 "Democratic Convention Acceptance Speech," New York Times, July
17, 1992, pp. 1, 10.
38 "Ronald H. Brown Emerges as a Major Force," New York Times, July
20, 1992, p. 1.
39 R. W. Apple, Jr., "Poll Gives Clinton a Post-Perot, Post-Convention
Boost, New York Times, July 18, 1992, p. 1.
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angriest and most anti-Bush. "40
The Clinton-Gore team was talcing no chances with their new
cushion of support. Several days after the convention ended they
embarked on an eight-state bus tour of mostly small-town America. In
a major Texas speech the Democratic presidential contender stated,
"Four years ago this crime issue was used to divide America. I want to
be tough on crime and good for civil rights. You can't have civil
justice without order and safety."41 Clinton's signing of death warrants
as Governor of Arkansas had aroused antagonism among many liberal
leaders, but it lent credibility to his call for being tough on crime. The
middle-class remained in focus for him. The Democratic nominee's
general election strategy was clear-cut, and expressed succinctly in a
sign at his Little Rock headquarters: "Change vs. more of the same.
The economy, stupid. Don't forget health care. "42
The Republican National Convention of 1992 reflected the disarray
and antagonisms which pervaded Bush's reelection campaign from its
start. It also reflected what appeared to be the President's hesitancy to
enter the campaign fray. The first two days of the convention were
turned over to the radical right. Their members, led by Pat Buchanan on
prime time television, spewed forth ideological anger, disdain for
cultural diversity, an absolutist anti-abortion position, and a
fundamentalist vision of morality. The speeches had not been cleared
by the White House.43
The GOP platform was as extreme as the Democratic party
platform was moderate. 44 The media and public reaction to this
outpouring of rancor was incredulity and dismay. The President's forces
regained control by the third day of the convention. Bush's acceptance
speech was a paean to his foreign policy leadership, a call for family
and traditional values, and a plea to judge each candidate on the basis of
his character. On civil rights, which Clinton had passed over with
40 11
Polls Seem to Offer Respite, But Clinton Pushes Pace," New York
Times July 26, 1992, p.22.
41 "Clinton in Houston Speech Assails Bush on Crime Issue," New York
Times, July 24, 1992, p. 13. See also: New York Times, July 21, 1992, p.

1.
42Michael

Kelly, "Democrat Fights Perceptions of Bush Gains, " New
York Times, October 31, 1992, 1.
43 See, for example, the following: Ross K. Baker, ''The Presidential
Nominations," in Gerald M. Pomper, et al., The Election of 1992 (Chatham,
N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1993), pp. 65-68; Ryan J. Barilleaux and
Randall E. Adkins, "The Nominations: Process and Patterns," in Michael
Nelson, ed., The Elections of 1992 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993),
pp. 52-54; Paul J. Quirk and John K. Dalager, ''The Election : A ' New
Democrat,"' in Nelson, ed., pp. 69-70; and, New York Times, August 1321, 1992.
44New York Times, August 13, 15, 18, 1992.
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quick broad strokes of support, Bush's words were also few: "we
strengthened our civil rights laws, and we did it without resorting to
quotas." 45 In 1988 the "Willie Horton" ad captured the public's
attention with its implicit interweaving of liberalism, crime, civil
rights advocacy and race. In 1992 the Bush campaign retreated from its
aggressive anti-affirmative action and anti-quotas position. The
President repeated, time after time, that he supported civil rights and he
supported the compromise employment bill, "without quotas," that he
had signed into law.
Ross Perot's reentry into the campaign on October 1 helped to
narrow Clinton's lead in the polls and raised concerns that neither
major-party candidate would secure an electoral college majority.
However, Perot's return did not appear to substantia11yalter the issue
positions of the major-party nominees.
The only time civil rights was again brought up in a forthright
manner was during the presidential debates. In the October 11 debate
the candidates were asked about "racial division .... Why is this still
happening in America and what would you do to end it?" None of the
respondents mentioned any specific proposals. Perot responded that
"during political campaigns I would urge everybody to stop trying to
split this country into fragments and appeal to the differences between
us .... We ought to love one another because united teams win and
divided teams lose." He never moved afar from this approach . Clinton
emphasized his growing up in the South and his having seen "the winds
of hatred divide people and keep the people of my state poorer than they
would have been, both spiritually and economically ." He continued in
a vague and non-commital tone for the remainder of his response. Bush
answered: "I've tried to use the White House as the bully pulpit,
speaking out against discrimination. We've passed two very forwardlooking civil rights bills. [Bush referred to the Americans with
Disabilities Act as a civil rights bill.] It's not going to be all done by
legislation .... "46
At the second debate the candidates were asked, "when do you
estimate your party will both nominate and elect an Afro-American and
female ticket to the Presidency of the United States?" This was the
only civil-rights-related question asked during this debate. All three
candidates answered rather innocuously. George Bush's initial response,
"I think if Barbara Bush were running this year she'd be elected," drew
the most laughs and the most attention after the debate ended. No one
else responded to the question with any specific proposals.47
45 "Transcript

of Bush Speech Accepting the Nomination for Another
Four Years, " New York Times, August 21, 1992, pp . 1, 12.
46 'Transcript, First Presidential Debate," New York Times, October 12,
1992.
41New York Times, October 16, 1992.
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At the third debate the President was asked, "let's move to some of
the leadership concerns that have been voiced about you... that you
began to focus on the economy, on health care, on racial divisions in
this country only after they became crises. Is that a fair criticism?" The
President responded that, "I don't think that's a fair shot." He proceeded
to respond to the civil rights section of the query by citing his support
for "the Americans with Disabilities Act, which I think is one of the
foremost pieces of civil rights legislation. And yes, it took me to veto
two civil rights quota bills, because I don't believe in quotas, and I don't
think the American people believe in quotas." He continued, "I beat the
Congress on that, and then we passed a decent civil rights bill that
offers guarantees against discrimination in employment and that is
good." He never talked about the Los Angeles riots. Perot passed on
answering the question. Clinton talked about the economy. He never
directly addressed the section of the question which dealt with race
relations and crises. 48 Race relations and civil rights were not issues
that these candidates wished to address in the 1992 presidential
campaign.

The "Outsiders" and Civil Rights as a "Non-Issue"
When the votes were counted Bill Clinton had been elected
President with 43.3 percent of the total votes cast, while George Bush
won 37.7 percent and Ross Perot received 19 percent Clinton won 83
percent of the black vote, and he carried 39 percent of the white vote,
while Bush won but 10 percent of the black vote while carrying 40
percent of the white vote. 49 The aversion of the candidates to deal with
the race issue was reflected in the lack of interest that the mass public
held for the issue on election day. When asked in the CBS News/New
York Times exit poll, "Which issues mattered most in deciding how
you voted?," less than five percent of the respondents indicated race or
civil rights as an answer. By a wide margin, the .related issues of the
economy and jobs, followed by health care, were most salient. Civil
rights or race were not mentioned as one of the top ten concerns.so
Personality explained two and a half times more of the variance in the
1988 presidential election outcome than did policy issues. In 1992,
policy evaluations explained seven times more of the variance in the
outcome than did personality.SI Thus, while policy was at stage center
48New York Times, October 20, 1992.
49 Election results cited here are from

the CBS News/New York Times
Exit Poll as cited in Quirk and Dalager, p. 78. For a brief, but insightful
analysis of the social group basis of the vote see: Gerald M. Pomper, "The
Presidential Election, " in Pomper, et al., pp. 135-140.
5°Quirk and Dalager, p. 81. See also: Pomper, in Pomper, et al., p. 146.
S!Philip Meyer, "The Media Reformation: Giving the Agenda Back to
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in the 1992 elections, civil rights policy was not among the issues that
swayed voters. Civil rights had become a "non-issue." It had been
effectively kept out of the public issue agenda in the 1992 presidential
election campaign.
Bill Clinton understood the damage wrought upon the Democratic
coalition by the civil rights issue. He lived in the South and he saw
the transformation of the region's politics as whites increasingly
deserted the party of Jefferson and Jackson during the 1960's, 1970's,
and 1980's in response to the primacy of civil rights issues on the
campaign agenda. He was determined not to repeat the tactical mistakes
of his Democratic predecessors and let race issues divide the party in
1992. He maintained his distance from Jesse Jackson and other
aggressive public advocates of civil rights, while assuring black and
white voters that he understood their needs. He stayed focused on the
economy and he argued that the incumbent president bore the
responsibility for its poor condition. That was Clinton's campaign
strategy from the outset in 1992 and he carried it out.
Almost every political observer has agreed that the election of 1992
became a referendum on George Bush and his handling of the
economy .52 Aside from a push for traditional morality and a call for
"family values," the Bush campaign did not pursue a New Right
strategy in 1992. The President did not seriously attempt to interject
race, the most powerfully divisive issue for the Democratic coalition in
recent years, into the 1992 campaign . In essence the Clinton forces
defined the campaign and the Bush-GOP camp did not retaliate with
their most powerful issue: race .
Perhaps the fight over the 1991 Civil Rights Act moved the
President away from pursuing this issue any further. Perhaps the death
of campaign strategist Lee Atwater left the Bush campaign staff without
a combative street-fighter who would do whatever it took to win. Pat
Buchanan was more than willing to take the race issue on but he was
kept at arm's length from the Bush camp. There was apparently no
comparable person available and positioned to do what Atwater had done
in 1988. Neither party was willing to take the polar position or pursue
serious debate about civil rights and the Democratic nominee was the
beneficiary of this default. Thus, civil rights became a "non-issue."
E. E. Schattschneider would perhaps suggest that what may have
been good for Bill Clinton and the Democrats may not have been good
for the democratic polity or one of its weakest groups , Africanthe People, " in Nelson, ed., p. 105
52 See, e.g., : R.W. Apple, Jr ., "The Economy's Casualty," New York
Times, November 4, 1992, p.l; Kathleen A. Frankovic, "Public Opinion in
the 1992 Campaign," in Pomper, et al., p. 130; Thomas Edsall, "Bloc
Busting : The Demise of the GOP Quest for a Majority, " Washington Post
National Weekly, October, 1992, 19-25.
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Americans. Democratic politics, to Schattschneider, is about the
socialization of conflict, the organizing into the public sphere of the
private battles that have kept the less-well-off in their place. He notes,
"every change in the scope of conflict has a bias; it is partisan in its
nature. "53 In this case, the bias mitigated against public discussion of a
crucial issue. Of course, it may well be that over the long run, as
Clinton's allies argue and Edsall and Edsall imply, the muting of civil
rights in the 1992 presidential campaign may redound to the benefit of
those individuals who would normally want to play it out in the open
political arena. Without the silencing of civil rights, the Clinton forces
assert, they may well not have won the presidency and be in a position
to use their powers in support of the issue. Yet this administration
backed away from its first major thrust in the area, the nomination of
Lani Guinier, a strong and controversial civil rights advocate, as
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 54 After a year in office,
the administration had yet to name another nominee for the position.
The "outsiders" were silenced during the campaign and their voice has
yet to emerge with major effect within this administration.

53 Schattschneider,

54 0n

p. 4.
the Guinier nomination fiasco see: New York Times, June 3, 4,

1993.
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